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Abstract
A mix network by Wikstrom fails in correctness, provable privacy and soundness. Its claimed
advantages in security and efficiency are compromised. The analysis in this paper illustrates
that although the first two failures may be fixed by modifying the shuffling protocol, the last
one is too serious to fix at a tolerable cost. Especially, an attack is proposed to show how easily
soundness of the shuffling scheme can be compromised. Moreover, the most surprising discovery
in this paper is that it is formally illustrated that in practice it is impossible to fix soundness of
the shuffling scheme by Wikstrom.
1 Introduction
Shuffling is a very important cryptographic technique to build mix network, which is popular kind
of anonymous communication channel. The most important application of mix network is electronic
voting, which is a highly sensitive application with critical requirements on security. As large-scale
election applications may involve a very large number of voters, high efficiency is often desired in
e-voting. In recent years, a few shuffling-based mix network schemes [1, 2, 21, 35, 29, 36, 39, 30, 38,
40, 37, 44, 28, 27] have been proposed. They claim to achieve strong security and high efficiency.
Among them, the most efficient in computation1 are [39], [28] and [44]. However, all of these three
schemes have weakness in security, although with difference in kind and degree.
As explained in Appendix A, the shuffling schemes in [39] and [28] have some drawbacks,
which make them unsuitable for applications with very critical security requirements like political
e-voting. Although the drawbacks of [39] and [28] limit their application, if they are not applied to
applications with very high security requirements, they are still very useful in practice. As a result,
if it is as secure as it claims, the shuffling scheme in [44] is the most efficient solution in computation
still remaining secure for shuffling based e-voting. An important question is: is the shuffling scheme
in [44] as secure as it claims? Our analysis demonstrates that the security problems in [44] are
much more serious than in [39] and [28] and compromise the most important security properties.
Our analysis start with a more obvious but less serious problem: the shuffling scheme in [44]
fails in correctness (defined in Section 2) and its proof of zero knowledge is based on incorrect
operations. As a result, to fit the proof of zero knowledge, a valid shuffling operation must risk
a failure in verification. Our analysis illustrates that due to two reasons, keeping the shuffling
1Like most work in shuffling, we focus on computation when discussing efficiency as in most cases communicational
cost is a monotone function of computational cost. The only exception is [27], which sacrifices computational efficiency
to achieve high efficiency in communication.
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scheme unchanged and decreasing the probability of failure of correctness by using special param-
eter setting is not an effective method to improve security. Firstly, there is a dilemma between
correctness and provable zero knowledge and decreasing the probability of failure of correctness will
increase the probability of failure of proof of zero knowledge. Secondly and more importantly, as
explained later the same inappropriate operations compromising correctness prevent the author’s
suggested method from implementing soundness as well. An appropriate modification can achieve
correctness and at the same time make implementation of soundness as suggested by the author
possible (although not necessarily guaranteeing soundness). So a more comprehensive countermea-
sure is needed and thus a modification is proposed in this paper to fix the shuffling scheme in [44]
and achieve correctness. As this modification affects provability of zero knowledge, a new privacy
analysis is needed to demonstrate achievement of statistical zero knowledge in the modified shuf-
fling protocol. As explained later, this modification is necessary in trying to implement author’s
suggested method to achieve soundness.
A more serious, more fatal but less obvious problem of [44] lies in soundness (defined in Sec-
tion 2). A key technique to guarantee soundness of the shuffling scheme in [44] is range proof, which
must be run multiple times to guarantee that multiple integers are in a special range. However,
range proof is not implemented in [44]. On one hand, in the outline of the shuffling scheme in
[44], range proof is emphasize to be necessary; on the other hand, in the detailed and complete
implementation of the shuffling scheme, range proof is not implemented or even mentioned in any
of the multiple operations depending on it for soundness. So there is a mystery: is range proof in
[44] too simple and too straightforward so ignored in the implementation or too difficult and too
controversy so avoided in the implementation? As it determines soundness of the shuffling scheme
in [44], the most efficient still-surviving shuffling scheme, this question must be answered. However,
as the information about the details of range proof in [44] is only a vague sentence, it is not easy
to figure the question out. Too sketchy description of key operation leaves a few doubts for the
readers to clear. Firstly, is the author really aware the necessity of range proof? How important is
range proof? Can it be ignored? Secondly, can the range proof primitive suggested by the author
implement range proof in his shuffling scheme? Can we ask the author to give an implementation
with detailed parameter setting and operations? If his method fails, does it just cannot work or
need optimisation in details (e.g. parameter setting and operational details)? Can we adjust the
parameter setting or operational details to fix the problem? If the adjustment is difficult, can we
formally prove that his method is irremediable and cannot be fixed at all? Thirdly, even if the
author’s range proof cannot work at all, can it be replaced by other range primitives unknown
to the author? Can another technique implement range proof in the shuffling scheme in [44] at a
tolerable cost? To discover the truth, we need to answer all the questions.
When the given information is not enough and many possibilities are left, the most reliable
way to handle it is to explore and try every possibility. If every possible detailed implementation
for a method is shown to not work, the method must fail. When there are a few doubts about
a scheme, the most responsible method to assess it is to discuss and answer the doubts one by
one. More doubts are verified to be problems, more sure are the readers about failure of the
scheme. In this way, we can attack a scheme and demonstrate its failure in the most convincing
way, leaving no space for any excuse or defense, even if its problems are hidden in incomplete, vague
and sketchy descriptions. Firstly, an attack is proposed to completely compromise soundness of the
shuffling scheme in [44] in absence of range proof. The attack allows invalid shuffling to pass the
verification of the shuffling protocol in [44], so the shuffled messages can be tampered with without
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being detected. So its missing in the detailed implementation is an inexcusable mistake. If the
implementation cannot be provided, the shuffling scheme definitely fail in soundness. Secondly, it
is clearly demonstrated that the range proof primitive suggested by the author cannot implement
range proof either in his original shuffling scheme or in the shuffling scheme modified by us to achieve
correctness and make implementation of soundness possible2. Further analysis formally illustrates
that the range proof primitive suggested in [44] is irremediable and always violates soundness of
the shuffling scheme no matter how it adjusts parameters and details. So the problem in soundness
of [44] is not only incompleteness in the claimed complete and detailed implementation, but also
an irremediable mistake of unimplementability of key operation, which cannot be fixed at all and
so cannot be excused as carelessness in implementation details. Thirdly, every other range proof
primitive not mentioned by the author is explored and each of them is demonstrated to greatly
deteriorate efficiency of the shuffling scheme in [44] and turn it into one of the least efficient shuffling
schemes if being employed. Thus, the final chance to maintain security and efficiency of the shuffling
scheme in [44] is eliminated. Therefore, it is concluded beyond any doubt and excuse that soundness
not only fails but also cannot be fixed at a tolerable cost in the shuffling scheme in [44], which is
the most important contribution and most surprising discovery in this paper.
2 Background: the Shuffling Scheme in [44]
In a shuffling protocol, a shuffling node re-encrypts and reorders multiple input ciphertexts to some
output ciphertexts such that the messages encrypted in the output ciphertexts are a permutation
of the messages encrypted in the input ciphertexts. Shuffling is usually employed to build up
anonymous communication channels and its most important application is e-voting. The following
properties must be satisfied in a shuffling protocol.
• Correctness: if the shuffling node strictly follows the shuffling protocol, the shuffling protocol
ends successfully and the plaintexts encrypted in the output ciphertexts are a permutation
of the plaintexts encrypted in the input ciphertexts.
• Public verifiability: the shuffling node can publicly prove that he does not deviate from the
shuffling protocol.
• Soundness: a successfully verified proof by a shuffling node guarantees that the plaintexts
encrypted in the output ciphertexts are a permutation of the plaintexts encrypted in the
input ciphertexts without any trust assumption on the shuffling node.
• Zero knowledge (ZK) Privacy: The permutation used by the shuffling node is not revealed.
More formally, a simulating transcript indistinguishable from the real shuffling transcript can
be generated by a polynomial party without any knowledge of the shuffling node’s secret
inputs.
Shuffling is frequently employed in anonymous communication and its most important appli-
cation is electronic voting, where the voters need to anonymously cast their votes. As stated in
Section 1, the shuffling scheme in [44] is a very efficient solution to shuffling based e-voting. Its
2As discussed before, the original shuffling scheme in [44] is inconsistent with the author’s suggested method
to implement soundness, while the shuffling scheme modified by us to achieve correctness avoids the contradiction
although not necessarily guaranteeing soundness.
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main idea is simple. Suppose N ElGamal ciphertexts (u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (uN , vN ) are input to
a shuffling node, which then outputs ciphertexts (u′1, v
′
1), (u
′
2, v
′
2), . . . , (u
′
N , v
′
N ). To prove that the
messages encrypted in (u′1, v
′
1), (u
′
2, v
′
2), . . . , (u
′
N , v
′
N ) is a permutation of the messages encrypted
in (u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (uN , vN ), given random primes p1, p2, . . . , pN in [2
K3−1, 2K3 −1] ([ ] stands
for a range of consecutive integers as defined in [44]), the shuffling node only needs to prove that
he knows secret integers ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN and pi(), a secret permutation of 1, 2, . . . , N , to satisfy
∏N
i=1(D(ui, vi))
pi =
∏N
i=1(D(u
′
i, v
′
i))
ρi , (1)
ρi = ppi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2)
where D() stands for decryption. For privacy of the shuffling, neither any ρi nor pi() can be revealed
in the proof. It has been illustrated in [29] that (1) and (2) guarantee that the messages encrypted
in (u′1, v
′
1), (u
′
2, v
′
2), . . . , (u
′
N , v
′
N ) is a permutation of the messages encrypted in (u1, v1), (u2, v2),
. . . , (uN , vN ). Soundness of this idea is more formally proved in [38, 40]. For all the shuffling
schemes employing this idea, satisfaction of (1) is easy to prove and the key technique is how to
prove satisfaction of (2). The method to prove (2) is claimed to be more efficient in [44] than in
[29] and [38, 40]. Satisfaction of (2) is reduced to satisfaction of the following three equations in
[44] where choice of K and its relation to other parameters are absent in [44] and will be discussed
later in Section 4.2.
−2K + 1 ≤ ρi ≤ 2
K − 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N (3)
∏N
i=1 pi =
∏N
i=1 ρi (4)
∑N
i=1 pi =
∑N
i=1 ρi (5)
A detailed proof protocol called Protocol 2 is employed in [44] to implement proof of (3), (4) and
(5). Note that Protocol 2 is not a sketchy outline but supposed to be a complete implementation
with every detail of the shuffling scheme in [44]. Proof of (4) and (5) is a straightforward application
of zero knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms [14], so quite easy. The key technique is
proof of satisfaction of (3). As Protocol 2 in [44] is a quite complex 7-step proof protocol, it is not
recalled here in its fully complete form and interested readers can find its fully complete description
in [44]. However, the operations closely related to proof and verification of (3) in Protocol 2 in [44]
is extracted as follows where definition of all the involved integers can be found in [44].
• In Step 6 of Protocol 2 in [44], the prover calculates and publishes
ei = cti + si mod 2
K2+K4+2K5 (6)
e′i = ct
′
i + s
′
i mod 2
K2+K4+2K5 (7)
di = cppi(i) + ri mod 2
K3+K4+K5 (8)
e = ct+ s mod 2K2+NK3+K4+K5+log2N (9)
e′ = ct′ + s′ mod 2K2+K5+log2 N (10)
where K2,K3,K4,K5 are integers defined in [44] as security parameters.
• In Step 7 of Protocol 2 in [44], it is verified
bciγi = h
eib
di
i−1 (11)
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b′
c
iγ
′
i) = h
e′
igdi (12)
(bc1α1, (V/b2)
cα2, W
cα3) = (13)
(gf1
∏N
i=1(u
′
i)
di , g−f2
∏N
i=1(v
′
i)
di , gfr′
∏N
i=1(gi)
di)
(bciγi, (b
′c
iγ
′
i) = (h
eib
di
i−1, h
e′
igdi) (14)
(g−
∏
N
i=1
pibN )
cγ = he (15)
(g−
∑
N
i=1
pi
∏N
i=1 b
′
i)
cγ = he
′
(16)
It is claimed in [44] that the shuffling protocol as described in Protocol 2 is a complete imple-
mentation to achieve correctness, soundness and zero knowledge in privacy.
3 Correctness and Provable Zero Knowledge — Failure and Fixing
In this section correctness and provability of zero knowledge of the shuffling protocol in [44] are
shown to fail as key operations employ wrong moduli. Our analysis illustrates that due to two
reasons, keeping the wrong moduli and decreasing the probability of failure of correctness by us-
ing special parameter setting is not an effective method to improve security. Firstly, there is a
dilemma between correctness and provable zero knowledge and decreasing the probability of failure
of correctness will increase the probability of failure of proof of zero knowledge. Secondly and
more importantly, as explained later the wrong moduli prevent the author’s suggested method
from implementing soundness as well. So a modification is proposed to achieve correctness, while
provability of zero knowledge and soundness are taken into account. We have to emphasize that it
is still needed to prove achievement of statistical zero knowledge in a new proof method. As such
needed proof or argument in statistical sense have been used in similar circumstances [42, 7, 43, 10]
and can be adopted in the shuffling protocol in [44], they are not detailed in this paper due to
space limitation. As explained later, this modification is necessary in trying to implement author’s
suggested method to achieve soundness.
3.1 Failure of Correctness
Correctness of the shuffling scheme in [44] requires that if the shuffling node strictly follows the
shuffling protocol and does not deviate from it in any way, he can pass all the verifications in Step 7
of Protocol 2 in [44]. However, satisfaction of (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) is not guaranteed
in [44] even if the shuffling node strictly follows the shuffling protocol and does not deviate from it.
More precisely, although (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) are satisfied when
ei = cti + si in Z, (17)
e′i = ct
′
i + s
′
i in Z, (18)
di = cppi(i) + ri in Z, (19)
e = ct+ s in Z, (20)
e′ = ct′ + s′ in Z, (21)
their satisfaction are not guaranteed when (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) are employed in Step 6 of
Protocol 2 in [44] as
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• the order of h is (p−1)(q−1)/2 instead of 2K2+K4+2K5 and cti+si, ct
′
i+s
′
i distribute beyond
2K2+K4+2K5 ;
• the order of gi is q as set in Section 2 of [44] instead of 2
K3+K4+K5 and cppi(i) + ri distributes
beyond 2K3+K4+K5 ;
• the parameter setting of the encryption algorithm in Section 4 of [44] implies that the order
of u′i is q instead of 2
K3+K4+K5 and cppi(i) + ri distributes beyond 2
K3+K4+K5 ;
• in Section 4.5 of [44], the author assumes mi ∈ Gq, so the order of v
′
i is q instead of 2
K3+K4+K5
and cppi(i) + ri distributes beyond 2
K3+K4+K5 ;
• the order of h is secret and not 2K2+NK3+K4+K5+log2N and ct+s distributes beyond 2K2+NK3+K4+K5+log2N ;
• the order of h is secret and not 2K2+K5+log2 N and ct′ + s′ distributes beyond 2K2+K5+log2N .
where p, q and q are secret system parameters defined in [44] and cannot be used by the prover.
In Section 3.2, Section 3.3 and Section 4.2, it is illustrated that the problem in correctness cannot
be solved by reducing the probability that correctness fails.
3.2 Dilemma between Correctness and Proof of Zero Knowledge
Failure of correctness seems to be a careless mistake and easy to fix. Removing the moduli when
calculating ei, e
′
i, di, e, and e
′ will lead to complete correctness. Alternatively, setting the param-
eters with appropriate values can make the probability that the moduli are used in calculating the
five integers negligible and thus guarantee correctness with a large probability. However, it is not
so simple. Let’s see why moduli different from the orders of the responses are employed. When
the orders are unknown, isn’t the non-modulus calculation simpler and completely consistent with
correctness? The reason is that the moduli are employed and they need take effect in calculation of
the responses with a large probability as strict and formal zero knowledge is desired in [44]. So both
these two countermeasures contradict proof of zero knowledge in [44]. Zero knowledge of Protocol
2 in [44] is proved in Proposition 1 in D.1 in Page 31 of [45] (2005 Version), in which an explicitly
emphasized necessary condition for zero knowledge of Protocol 2 is that
• ei = cti + si mod 2
K2+K4+2K5 such that ei is uniformly distributed in Z2K2+K4+2K5 and thus
can be simulated;
• e′i = ct
′
i + s
′
i mod 2
K2+K4+2K5 such that e′i is uniformly distributed in Z2K2+K4+2K5 and thus
can be simulated;
• di = cppi(i)+ ri mod 2
K3+K4+K5 such that di is uniformly distributed in Z2K3+K4+K5 and thus
can be simulated;
• e = ct+s mod 2K2+NK3+K4+K5+log2N such that e is uniformly distributed in Z2K2+NK3+K4+K5+log2 N
and thus can be simulated;
• e′ = ct′ + s′ mod 2K2+K5+log2 N such that e′ is uniformly distributed in Z2K2+K5+log2 N and
thus can be simulated.
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So the modulo computations in (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) are deliberately used for the sake of proof
of zero knowledge in [44]. Both the two countermeasures calculate the five integers without any
modulus with at least an overwhelmingly large probability. In this case, their distribution is not
uniform as claimed and needed in Proposition 1 in [44]. Instead, their distribution is more dense in
the middle of their distribution range and more sparse near the edge of their distribution range. So
the proof of Proposition 1 in [44] fails and new proof of zero knowledge is needed. Actually, with
both the two countermeasures the five integers become monotone functions of five corresponding
secret integers with at least an overwhelmingly large probability, so publication of them reveals
some information about the secret integers and thus (at least partially) compromises the claimed
zero knowledge property. This dilemma will be solved in Section 3.3.
3.3 Fixing the Two Drawbacks
To fixing the two drawbacks, we only have the following two options, either keeping the wrong
moduli or removing them.
• Option 1:
Still employing (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) with the wrong moduli in Step 6 of Protocol 2 in
[44] and relying on its Proposition 1 for zero knowledge, with a hope that the probability of
failure of correctness is low or even negligible without compromising proof of zero knowledge.
This hope is unrealistic as
– if the modulus computation takes effect with a large probability when a response is
calculated as it otherwise overflows the modulus, correctness of the shuffling scheme
fails;
– if the modulus computation does not take effect with a large probability when a response
is calculated as it is small enough, proof of Proposition 1 and thus zero knowledge
property in [44] fail as explained in Section 3.2.
So with this option, correctness and provable zero knowledge cannot be achieved simultane-
ously and at least one of them must fail in [44] no matter how parameter setting is adjusted.
• Option 2
Since modulo operations are expected to take effect with a negligible probability for the sake
of security, why not remove them? Employing the modified operations (17), (18), (19), (20)
and (21) in Step 6 of Protocol 2 in [44], abandoning its Proposition 1 and designing a new
proof mechanism to demonstrate zero knowledge. In doing this, the following difficulties must
be noticed.
– As the responses are calculated without any modulus and become monotone functions
of the corresponding secrets, when the secrets are unknown they cannot be simulated
without any difference. So proof of ZK must be upgraded.
– The new zero knowledge proof is more complex as it involves statistical ZK [42, 7, 43, 10],
which proves two distributions are different but cannot be distinguished. That may
be the reason why the modulo computations are still employed in calculation of the
responses in [44] although they compromise correctness.
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A comprehensive solution is designed based on Option 2. Namely, the modified operations (17),
(18), (19), (20) and (21) are adopted in Step 6 of Protocol 2 in [44] and the modified protocol
is called MP2 (modified protocol 2). This choice is made due to two reasons. Firstly, Option 1
cannot handle the dilemma between correctness and provable zero knowledge in [44]. Secondly, as
discussed in Section 4.2, Option 1 is inconsistent with the author’s suggested method to implement
soundness. As mentioned before, MP2 only achieves statistical zero knowledge and thus modeling
and analysis of ZK privacy of the shuffling scheme must be completely upgraded using statistical
zero knowledge techniques. Fortunately, proof of achievement of statistical zero knowledge in the
case of MP2 is a mature technique and has been specified and explained very clearly in the literature
[42, 7, 43, 10]. So due to space limit, its details are not provided here and interested readers can
read the literature.
4 A More Serious Problem: Failure and Infeasibility of Soundness
In this section, soundness of the shuffling scheme in [44] is demonstrated to fail. A very important
operation is missing and cannot be implemented as suggested. The method suggested for the
implementation is formally illustrated to fail and to be irremediable. The efficiency claim in [44]
implies that no alternative method (e.g. [6] or [34]) is efficient enough for the implementation.
The most important and surprising discovery is that we can formally prove that no modification
or optimisation can satisfactorily fix the problem in soundness.
To achieve soundness in the shuffling scheme in [44], Protocol 2 as a complete implementation of
it must guarantee that (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied. Satisfaction of (4) and (5) is straightforward,
but we find no way to satisfy (3) in Protocol 2 in [44]. Actually, parameter K is not mentioned in
any way in Protocol 2 in [44], which is K free and thus (3) free. Then how can Protocol 2 in [44]
guarantee (3)? We test Protocol 2 in [44] and find that as long as (4) and (5) are satisfied the prover
can always pass the verification of Protocol 2 in [44] no matter whether −2K + 1 ≤ ρi ≤ 2
K − 1
is satisfied for any chosen K. Actually, once (4) and (5) are satisfied, no additional requirement
on any ρi (e.g. requiring it to be in [−2
K + 1, 2K − 1] or any other range) is needed to pass the
verification in Protocol 2 in [44]. To more convincingly demonstrate vulnerability of Protocol 2,
an attack is proposed to compromise soundness of in [44]. Note that Protocol 2 is not a sketchy
outline but supposed to be a complete implementation with every detail of the shuffling scheme in
[44]. So there is a problem of incompleteness in implementation.
Our analysis demonstrates that the problem in range proof in [44] is not only incompleteness
in the claimed detailed and complete implementation, but also a complete failure of range proof
suggested by the author. To confirm the author’s suggestion, a comprehensive analysis of avail-
able tools is employed to clarify a vague and sketchy hint, which may have hidden the problem.
Our method is to have a comprehensive survey of every possibility and eliminate each infeasible
choice, so that the only possible choice can be found, which mostly fits the author’s suggestion and
meets the efficiency claim but cannot work. This method finds that although the original shuffling
scheme in [44] is inconsistent with the author’s suggested method to implement soundness, there
is no contradiction between MP2 and the author’s suggested method to implement soundness3.
Unfortunately, it is then formally illustrated that even if range proof is implemented as suggested
in [44] in MP2 it cannot guarantee satisfaction of (3). Moreover, it is formally illustrated that the
3This discovery has been mentioned in Section 1, Section 3 and Section 3.3 and will be detailed in Section 4.2 as
a reason for modifying the original shuffling scheme in [44] into MP2.
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problem cannot be fixed by modifying the range proof technique (e.g. adjusting parameters or other
details). In addition, alternative range proof techniques (which are not considered or mentioned in
[44]) cannot fit the requirements on security and efficiency of [44]. Therefore, beyond any doubt
and excuse soundness not only fails but also cannot be fixed at a tolerable cost in the shuffling
scheme in [44].
4.1 An Attack against Soundness
When (3) is not satisfied, satisfaction of (2) cannot be guaranteed by only (4) and (5). Therefore, in
the shuffling scheme in [44], as (3) is not guaranteed the messages encrypted in the output cipher-
texts are not guaranteed to be a permutation of the messages encrypted in the input ciphertexts
and thus its soundness fails. More precisely, when the sum of ρis equals the sum of pis and the
product of ρis equals the product of pis, there is no guarantee that ρis is a permutation of pis. When
only (4) and (5) are satisfied, a simple attack and be launched so that ρis is not a permutation of
pis. A shuffling node chooses some ρi as the products of multiple pi’s and 1 or -1 and some other
ρi as 1 or -1 such that the sum of ρis equals the sum of pis, just so simple. There are many such
choices for the attack to succeed. A simple example is N = 10, p1 = p2 = . . . = p10 = 2 while
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = ρ4 = 4, ρ5 = ρ6 = 2, ρ7 = ρ8 = 1 and ρ9 = ρ10 = −1. Another simple examples is
N = 10, p1 = p2 = 2, p3 = p4 = 3, p5 = p6 = 5, p7 = p8 = 7, p9 = p10 = 11 while ρ1 = ρ2 = 22,
ρ3 = ρ4 = 15, ρ5 = ρ6 = −7, ρ7 = ρ8 = ρ9 = ρ10 = −1.
Readers can easily verify that these two examples can pass the verification operations in [44]
while ρis is not a permutation of pis. We checked each of the three membership tests and the
eight equations in the verification (Step 7) of Protocol 2 in [44] and found that none of them can
detect this attack. So this attack can pass the verification of the shuffling scheme in [44]. Although
the on-line version of [45] is modified recently to defend its mistake, concrete counter-examples
are much more convincing than its argument. We wrote a computer program to search for such
examples given p1, p2, . . . , pN and found countless of them, each of which is a counterexample to
Protocol 2 in [44]. Although our program uses brutal-force search, the search is still fast on a
normal desktop when N is not large. When the attack works with an N1, it works as well with
a larger N2 as putting an incorrect permutation of N1 ciphertexts and a correct permutation of
N2 −N1 ciphertexts together produces an incorrect permutation of N2 ciphertexts. So the attack
can always be efficient no matter how large N is. It has been illustrated in [29, 38, 40] that when
the ρis is not a permutation of the pis, incorrect shuffling can satisfy (1) and pass the verification
and thus soundness of shuffling is broken. So this attack compromises soundness of shuffling in [44].
This attack convincingly shows how serious the crisis of soundness is when proof of (3) is not
implemented. So there is a question: in [44], as a very important operation, is proof of (3) omitted
due to the author’s carelessness or just infeasible to implement as efficiently as claimed?
4.2 Comprehensive Analysis to Clarify the Author’s Suggestion
Last subsection convincingly demonstrates the necessity of (3) with a concrete countermeasure.
Note that (3) contains N instances of range proof, in which a prover commits to (or encrypt)
an integer and then proves that the committed integer is in a certain range consisting of some
consecutive integers. If the author had thought range proof is too simple and straightforward in
his shuffling scheme and thus had ignored it or he had been careless and forgotten to implement
it, the range proof technique suggested by him would be able to implement range proof in his
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shuffling scheme. The only clue about range proof in [44] is “We then note that a standard proof
of knowledge over a group of unknown order also gives an upper bound on the bit-size of the
exponents, i.e., it implicitly proves that ρi ∈ [−2
K + 1, 2K − 1]”, which seems to suggest a method
to implement range proof. As it is quite vague and provides no further detail or citation and its
implementation is missing in Protocol 2 in [44], more work is needed to confirm and instantiate the
author’s suggestion.
As no novel range proof technique is proposed in [44], it can only employ an existing range
proof technique to implement proof of (3). We need to eliminate the possibility that the author
has another range proof technique in his mind, but forgets to include it in the description of the
shuffling protocol in [44] by carelessness. Let’s examine whether any of the existing range proof
techniques fits the shuffling scheme in [44].
The most straightforward range proof technique is ZK proof of partial knowledge [16], which
proves that the committed integer may be each integer in the range one by one and then link the
multiple proofs with OR logic. It has a drawback: low efficiency. It is well known that it can be
optimised by sealing the committed integer bit by bit and proving each commitment contains a bit.
However, the optimised solution is still inefficient especially when the range size is large.
Boudot notices that gx is a computationally binding commitment of x in Z when the order of g
is unknown. Thus a computationally binding commitment function can be designed and any non-
negative committed integer can be proved to be non-negative by showing that it is no smaller than
a square. So Boudot employs commitment of integers in Z instead of the traditional commitment
of integers with a modulus in his range proof [6]. This special commitment function enables him
to reduce range proof in a range R to range proofs easier to implement. As a result his scheme
achieves asymptotical precision. Moreover, it is more efficient than the solution based on [16].
Commitment of integers in Z is employed in [34] as well, which combines it with an interesting
fact: any non-negative integer can be written as the sum of four squares. The range proof scheme
in [34] employs an algorithm to find the four squares to sum up any non-negative integer and then
prove that the integer is non-negative through a proof of knowledge of the square roots of the
four squares. In this way, it implements range proof and achieves completely perfect precision.
Moreover, it has a constant cost independent of the range size.
As the range proof techniques in [6] and [34] are still not efficient enough, a very efficient range
proof is widely used. It is not systematically proposed in any single paper, but employed in a wide
range of applications [4, 20, 11, 7, 3, 42, 17, 12, 9, 31, 15, 32, 33, 44, 23, 22, 47]. The idea is simple:
to prove that a secret integer x is in a range R, a monotone function of x, cx+ r in Z is published.
If cx + r is in a range R′, x can be guaranteed to be in R. We call this method monotone test.
Unlike the other range proof techniques, monotone test is not a general solution to range proof and
its application has some special limitations (e.g. in choice of R, R′, x and other parameters) as
pointed out in [6] (Details like discussion of expansion rate can be found in [6]).
Which range proof technique may the author plan to employ to implement his shuffling scheme
in [44]? We can deduce that it must be monotone test due to the following reasons.
• It slightly modifies an already employed proof of knowledge of discrete of logarithm without
employing any additional operation, so fits the author’s suggestion “proof of knowledge over
a group of unknown order also gives an upper bound on the bit-size of the exponents, i.e., it
implicitly proves ......”; while the other range proof technqiues needs explicit and addtional
operations and should have been explictly described in Protocol 2 in [44] if employed.
• Only monotone test meets the efficiency claim of [44] (in Section 5.5 of [44]) as it needs no
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extra cost. The other range proof technqiues are too costly for [44]. Even [6], the most
efficient of them, needs 40n more exponentiations to implement the N range proofs in (3)
and will contradict the efficiency claim of [44] and make it the least effcient shuffling scheme
in the past decade.
If the N instances of missing range proof in the shuffling scheme in [44] is implemented with
monotone test, calculation of di in Step 6 of Protocol 2 in [44] must be modified into
di = cppi(i) + ri in Z
such that di becomes a modulus-free monotone function of ρi = ppi(i). Namely, as mentioned before
the original shuffling scheme in [44] must be modified into MP2 to fit monotone test. Then in Step
7 of MP2, di must be verified in a range R
′. However, there are still two unclear but very important
details to consider.
• In [44], as a very important security parameter, K is not defined and its relation to other
parameters is completely unknown. Obviously, (2) is not always guaranteed by (3), (4) and
(5) with any K. To guarantee satisfaction of (2), K must be appropriately instantiated. We
believe that K should be set as K3, such that (3), (4) and (5) can guarantee (2) due to the
following reasons.
– If K > K3, when there exist i, j and k such that ρi = pjpk, (3) can still be satisfied.
For example, suppose pj and pk are the smallest primes larger than 2
K3−1, then it is
very possible that their product is smaller than 2K . So when K > K3, (2) cannot be
guaranteed and thus soundness of the shuffling scheme in [44] fails.
– If K < K3, when a ppi(i) is larger than 2
K − 1 but smaller than 2K3 , the ρi generated
according to the shuffling protocol is larger than 2K − 1 and thus cannot pass (3),
which means an honest shuffling node cannot pass the verification and correctness of the
shuffling scheme in [44] fails.
However, our deduction is not hinted or supported in any way in [44].
• An appropriate R′ must be chosen to guarantee satisfaction of (3). However, there is not
any hint in [44] about its existence or choosing method. As monotone test is not a general
solution to range proof and is limited in application, it is unsure whether an appropriate R′
can be found.
To confirm our deduction and clarify the mysteries above, we contacted the author of [44]. In
correspondence with us, the author confirmed our deduction and suggested to add a verification
to Step 7 of Protocol 2 in his scheme to implement monotone test: di < 2
K3+K4+K5 . He argues
that this additional verification can guarantee that no ρi can be large enough to be the product
of two pis. Although the original Protocol 2 is not consistent with monotone test, which requires
to calculate di in a modulus-free way, MP2 proposed in Section 3.3 can employ monotone test as
it has modified the calculation di to be modulus-free. We combine MP2 and the additional test
di < 2
K3+K4+K5 suggested by the author and denote the result as MSBMT (modified shuffling
based on monotone test), where (3) is instantiated into
− 2K3 + 1 ≤ ρi ≤ 2
K3 − 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (22)
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4.3 Failure of the Author’s Suggestion to Achieve Soundness
Soundness of MSBMT lies in that the author believes that ρi is guaranteed to be in [−2
K3+1, 2K3−1]
when di < 2
K3+K4+K5 . Is his claim reliable? As monotone test is not a general solution we need to
check whether it is suitable for the range proof in (22). It is determined by whether the shuffling
node can win the following game.
1. When running MSBMT the shuffling node chooses ri and ρi such that ρi /∈ [−2
K3+1, 2K3−1].
2. In the course of MSBMT a value is randomly chosen in [2K4−1, 2K4 − 1] for the challenge c.
3. The shuffling node outputs di = cρi + ri to satisfy (11), (12), (13) and (14).
4. He wins the game if di happens to be smaller than 2
K3+K4+K5 .
If the shuffling node can win the game with a non-negligible probability, he can pass the verification
of MSBMT with invalid ρi with a non-negligible probability and thus soundness of MSBMT fails.
Unfortunately, the shuffling node can always win the game using the following attack.
1. When running MSBMT the shuffling node chooses an integer ρi larger than 2
K3 − 1 and then
a random integer ri smaller than 2
K3+K4+K5 − ρi2
K4 .
2. When the shuffling node receives an integer c in [2K4−1, 2K4 − 1], he outputs di = cρi + ri.
As ri < 2
K3+K4+K5 − ρi2
K4 , it is always satisfied that
di = cρi + ri < 2
K4ρi + ri < 2
K4ρi + 2
K3+K4+K5 − ρi2
K4 = 2K3+K4+K5
and he can always win the game. Namely, no matter whether ρi is in [−2
K3+1, 2K3−1] or how large
its absolute value is, no matter which value is chosen from [2K4−1, 2K4 − 1] as c after the shuffling
node chooses ρi and ri, he can always choose a special ri to pass the verification in MSBMT. So
(22) is not guaranteed in MSBMT. When a ρi is no smaller than 2
K3 it may be the product of
multiple pis. When a ρi is no smaller than 2
K3+1 − 1 it can certainly be the product of multiple
pis without any doubt. Therefore, soundness of MSBMT is compromised by the attack.
Maybe the author is careless and forgets to set the lower bound for R′. Maybe when he says di
must be smaller than 2K3+K4+K5 , he actually means di must be in [0, 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1]. In this case,
the attack above cannot work. However, another attack against soundness can work as follows.
1. The shuffling node chooses an invalid positive value for ρi.
2. He chooses ri ∈ [−2
K4−1ρi, 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1− (2K4 − 1)ρi].
3. When being challenged with c, the shuffling node returns a response di = cρi + ri.
As
di = cρi + ri = cρi + ri ≤ (2
K4 − 1)ρi + 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1− (2K4 − 1)ρi =
2K3+K4+K5 − 1,
di = cρi + ri = cρi + ri ≥ 2
K4−1ρi − 2
K4−1ρi = 0,
the attack can succeed on the condition that −2K4−1ρi ≤ 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1 − (2K4 − 1)ρi and
[−2K4−1ρi, 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1 − (2K4 − 1)ρi] is a valid range. As any ρi with an absolute value no
smaller than 2K3 is invalid and 2K5 must be overwhelmingly large (e.g. K5 = 50 in [44]), this
condition can be satisfied even if ρi is much larger than 2
K3 .
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4.4 Formal Proof of Infeasibility to Fix the Problem
Although soundness of MSBMT fails with the R′ suggested by the author of [44]), optimistic
opinion may still hope that the failure is caused by inappropriate choice of R′ and there may exist
an appropriate R′ for monotone test to guarantee soundness of MSBMT. However, Theorem 1
illustrates that as application of monotone test is not general but limited no such R′ exists and it
is impossible to limit the range of ρi by checking the size of di in MSBMT.
Theorem 1 Suppose the absolute value of ρi can be guaranteed to be smaller than 2
K3 in MSBMT
when di = cppi(i) + ri is in a certain range [A,B], then a contradiction can be found.
Proof:
• On one hand, the width of [A,B] must be smaller than 2K3(2K4 − 1 − 2K4−1), otherwise
B−A ≥ 2K3(2K4 − 1− 2K4−1) and the shuffling node can attack by choosing an invalid ρi as
ρi = 2
K3 and then ri ∈ [A− 2
K4−12K3 , B − (2K4 − 1)2K3 ]. In this attack, with any challenge
c in [2K4−1, 2K4 − 1],
di = cρi + ri = c2
K3 + ri ≤ (2
K4 − 1)2K3 +B − (2K4 − 1)2K3 = B,
di = cρi + ri = c2
K3 + ri ≥ 2
K4−12K3 +A− 2K4−12K3 = A.
So the attack succeeds if A−2K4−12K3 ≤ B−(2K4−1)2K3 and [A−2K4−12K3 , B−(2K4−1)2K3 ]
is a valid range. As B −A ≥ 2K3(2K4 − 1− 2K4−1),
(B − (2K4 − 1)2K3)− (A− 2K4−12K3) = (B −A)− (2K4 − 1− 2K4−1)2K3
≥ 2K3(2K4 − 1− 2K4−1)− (2K4 − 1− 2K4−1)2K3 = 0.
So A− 2K4−12K3 ≤ B − (2K4 − 1)2K3 and [A− 2K4−12K3 , B − (2K4 − 1)2K3 ] is a valid range,
and thus the attack can succeed.
• On the other hand, when the width of [A,B] is smaller than 2K3(2K4 − 1 − 2K4−1) the
probability that an honest shuffling node can pass the monotone test is negligible as shown
in the following.
1. The honest shuffling node has ρi = ppi(i).
2. The honest shuffling node chooses ri randomly from [0, 2
K3+K4+K5 − 1].
3. When being challenged with c, the honest shuffling node returns a response di = cρi+ri.
As ri is randomly chosen from [0, 2
K3+K4+K5−1], it is uniformly distributed in [0, 2K3+K4+K5−
1]. So no matter how large c is, di is uniformly distributed in a range as wide as 2
K3+K4+K5 .
As the width of [A,B] is smaller than 2K3(2K4 − 1− 2K4−1) and 2K5 must be overwhelmingly
large (e.g. K5 = 50 in [44]), di is uniformly distributed in a very large range, in comparison
with which the width of [A,B] is negligible. So the probability that di falls in [A,B] is
negligible.
✷
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4.5 Unsuitability of Other Range Proof Techniques
Monotone test has been formally illustrated to be unable to implement the range proof in the
original shuffling scheme in [44] or MSBMT. So the only way to obtain soundness is to apply
another range proof technique to MP2 although they are not the choice of the author in [44].
Unfortunately, the other existing range proof primitives are much less efficient than monotone test.
The N instances of range proof in [−2K3 +1, 2K3 −1] (or at least in [2K3−1, 2K3 −1]) cost O(N2K3)
exponentiations with the original technique in [16] or O(NK3) exponentiations with its optimisation
and both are much more costly than the cost of the original shuffling scheme in [44]. Although
the range proof primitives in [6] and [34] are more efficient, application of N instances of either
of them is still too costly for shuffling. As both of them can only work with special commitment
functions, to employ either of them firstly the shuffling node must commit to each secret logarithm
to be proved in the certain range in a special commitment function and then he has to prove that
the same logarithm is used in the shuffling protocol and committed in the commitment function
using zero knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms ([14] or its variant). After that the
range proof primitive in [6] or [34] can be applied and each application cost several exponentiations.
Not only the cost of the N instances of range proof but also the commitment functions and their
corresponding proof of equality of logarithms are more costly than the original shuffling scheme
in [44]. So employing any other range proof than monotone test will greatly increase the cost in
computation and communication and leads to an shuffling scheme much less efficient than most
existing shuffling schemes.
5 Conclusion
The mix network in [44] fails in correctness, has an unreliable proof of zero knowledge and cannot
achieve soundness. Although we managed to restore correctness by fixing the proof protocol and
adopting statistical zero knowledge, soundness is impossible in [44] as a key operation in it, N
instances of range proof, cannot be implemented. As a result, a simple attack can compromise the
shuffling scheme. In the shuffling protocol in [44], not only range proof is not implemented, but also
the suggested method cannot implement it. Fixing the suggested range proof is impossible, while
no alternative technique can guarantee soundness of the shuffling scheme in [44] at a tolerable cost.
That may be why implementation of range proof is only very vaguely hinted and completely missing
in the detailed implementation in [44] supposed to be complete although it is very important. Our
conclusion is that if we cling to monotone test suggested by the author there is no way to guarantee
soundness. If it is replaced by any other range proof techniques [16, 6, 34], the additional operations
in the N instances of range proof will greatly increase the cost in computation and communication
and leads to an shuffling scheme much less efficient than most existing shuffling schemes.
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A Drawbacks of [39] and [28]
There are two drawbacks in [39]. Firstly, [39] only supports a small fraction of all the possible
permutations. So its privacy is much weaker than that of other shuffling schemes, which support
all the possible permutations. Secondly, it requires that the shuffling node (e.g. tallier) does
not obtain collusion of the message providers (e.g. voters) and has no knowledge of the shuffled
messages. So it is impractical in applications with critical requirement on security like political
e-voting, whose soundness cannot rely on any trust on the participants.
The shuffling scheme in [28] employs exceptionally small parameters to improves efficiency of
[30], so its soundness is weaker. Firstly, it employs much smaller challenges in its ZK proof than in
[30], so its soundness may fail with a much larger (although still regarded small in circumstances
with looser security requirements) probability. Secondly, it depends on bindingness of a commitment
function but achieves too weak bindingness in the commitment function. Commitment function
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com(m1,m2, . . . ,mk, r) =
∏k
i=1 g
mi
i h
r is employed in [30] where the order of g1, g2, . . . , gk and h
is q. Soundness of the three-move proof in [28] is based on an assumption: binding property of
the commitment function is computationally unbreakable such that in the third move the prover is
forced to use the unique set of secret integers committed in the first move to generate his response
to the random challenge in the second move (see the two theorems in [28] for more details of this
assumption). It is illustrated and emphasized in [29, 44] (which employ the same main idea) and
recognised in [28] that in such proof mechanism soundness of shuffling fails if the commitment is
not binding and the prover can adjust the committed integers after it receives the challenge. In
[28] the length of q is only 240 bits for the sake of high efficiency. Note that obtaining loggi gj
or loggi h is enough to break the binding property of the commitment function, which depends on
hardness of calculating such discrete logarithms. Therefore, breaking soundness of the shuffling in
[28] is no harder than calculating a 240-bit discrete logarithm. As a building block claimed to be
mainly used in electronic voting (which is often a very sensitive political activity and requires very
high level of security), it is inappropriate for the shuffling protocol to base its security on hardness
to calculate a 240-bit discrete logarithm, which is commonly regarded to be not hard enough for
a powerful adversary in the current security standard. In comparison, the other shuffling schemes
employ bases with much larger orders and base their soundness on hardness to calculate at least
1024-bit long discrete logarithms. In summary, [28] drastically improves efficiency of [30] by using
exceptionally small parameters. However, it weakens soundness to an extent intolerable in many
e-voting applications.
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